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The Pacific island economies are among the 
most vulnerable economies in the world. 
They are highly prone to natural disasters 
and terms-of-trade shocks. In the past two 
decades, however, some have maintained 
remarkable macroeconomic stability in 
terms of low inflation and low budget 
deficits. Most of these economies have, 
however, failed to grow at a reasonable rate. 
Aid inflows (grants) have been an important 
source of government finance. The lack of 
economic progress in the presence of large 
aid flows has been described as the ‘Pacific 
paradox’ (World Bank 1993).
This paper examines the macroeconomic 
performance of the Pacific island countries. 
It includes analyses of economic growth, 
inflation and balances of payment, and the 
possible contributions of fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies. Wherever 
possible, comparisons are made with small 
island economies in other regions, such as 
in the Caribbean. Finally, the paper provides 
a general framework for macroeconomic 
policies as part of a state-led development 
strategy. 
The Pacific island economies
There are 22 Pacific island economies, spread 
across some 30 million square kilometres in 
the South Pacific Ocean (Fairbairn 1999:44). 
The total land area of those countries is, 
however, just more than 500,000 square 
kilometres. Papua New Guinea is the largest 
economy, accounting for 83 per cent of the 
region’s land area and 80 per cent of the 
total population of just more than seven 
million. The next largest economy is Fiji, 
with an estimated population of 848,000 and 
total land area of 18,376 square kilometres; 
followed by Solomon Islands, with an 
estimated population of 470,860 and a 
total land area of 27,556 square kilometres. 
Other large sovereign countries are Vanuatu 
(population 214,970), Samoa (population 
179,000) and Tonga (population 101,800). 
New Caledonia (18,734 square kilometres), 
with a population of 230,790, is a French 
territory. Four micro-states are federated 
into the Federated States of Micronesia. The 
Federated States of Micronesia is a sovereign 
state in free association with the United 
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States—as are Palau and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands. The rest of the economies 
are micro-states, such as Nauru, Niue, 
Tuvalu and Palau.
The structure of the Pacific island 
countries fits Khatkhate and Short’s 
(1980:1018) description of mini-states.
Goods which are produced tend to 
be exported, goods which are sold in 
the mini state tend to be imported, 
and the commodities which are both 
produced and consumed within the 
mini state tend to be services. Even a 
substantial amount of these services 
may be purchased by foreigners 
in a mini state which specialises in 
tourism, offshore banking, offshore 
insurance or tax avoidance facilities.
Almost all Pacific island countries fall 
within the low-income group of developing 
countries as defined by the United Nations, 
with gross national product (GNP) per 
capita ranging from US$700 (in Kiribati) 
to US$3,900 (in Cook Islands). Some have 
substantial mineral deposits—Papua New 
Guinea (gold, copper, oil and nickel), 
Fiji (gold) and Solomon Islands (gold)—
however, agriculture and fisheries are the 
main economic activities, and the public 
sector is the largest employer. Most are 
highly dependent on foreign aid; some 
are among the highest aid recipients in the 
world, with annual average per capita aid 
as high as US$1,250.
Although most of these economies 
have low per capita incomes, quite a few 
have managed to achieve high literacy 
rates and long life expectancies. Their 
achievements therefore, in terms of the 
United Nations Development Program’s 
Human Development Index, are much 
higher than would be expected at their level 
of per capita income.
Pacific island countries face serious 
constraints to growth and development 
stemming from their geographical and 
demographic characteristics. The Economic 
and Social Survey 2006 of the UN Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) observes that
Pacific island economies face many 
daunting problems in their quest for 
economic growth and sustainable 
development. These include the 
Table 1  Economic vulnerability of Pacific island countries
Country Output Rank Composite  Rank 
 volatility index  vulnerability index
Vanuatu 3.61 90 13.295 1 
Tonga 13.18 4 10.439 3 
Fiji 6.84 32 8.888 8 
Solomon Islands 11.21 9 8.398 11 
Samoa 6.92 30 7.371 20 
Papua New Guinea 5.03 65 6.308 30 
Kiribati	 16.6	 1	 5.082	 59
Note: Small states are defined as those with populations of 1.5 million or less. The sample includes 111 
developing countries. Output volatility is defined as the standard deviation of annual rates of growth of per 
capita constant price (purchasing power parity, PPP) gross domestic product during 1980–92.  
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000. Small states: meeting challenges in the global economy, Report 
prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, World Bank, 
Washington, DC:Table 2).
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physical disadvantages of remoteness, 
smallness and dispersion, significantly 
rising transport and other development 
costs and limited opportunities for 
realising economies of scale. In many 
cases, rapid population growth 
exerts pressure on scarce resources 
and frustrates efforts to raise living 
standards. The severe shortages of 
professional and technical skills, 
paucity of domestic savings and 
vulnerability to external shocks 
pose further constraints (ESCAP 
2006:66–7).
According to the composite vulnerability 
index (CVI) of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
the level of economic vulnerability of Pacific 
island countries is among the highest in the 
world (Commonwealth Secretariat 2000). 
This index is based on the experience of 
111 developing countries’ vulnerability to 
natural disasters, terms-of-trade instability 
and capital flows during the 1990s. Vanuatu 
ranks as the most vulnerable economy 
in the world (Table 1); Tonga ranks third, 
Fiji eighth, Solomon Islands eleventh and 
Samoa twentieth.
The economic vulnerability of Pacific 
island countries is, however, a common 
characteristic of small economies.1 For 
example, similar small island states such as 
the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles (in 
the Indian Ocean) and Antigua, Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Saint Kilda 
(in the Caribbean) have CVI scores within 
the highest 30. The evaluation of the 
macroeconomic performance and policies 
of these countries must, therefore, take 
their exceptional vulnerability into account. 
Macroeconomic policies in highly vulnerable 
economies have to be different from those 
in more stable economies, and policymakers 
should refrain from looking for universal 
prescriptions. It is pertinent to bear in mind 
the recent reflection of the World Bank in 
this regard: ‘[t]here is no unique universal 
set of rules…we need to get away from 
formulae and the search for elusive “best 
practices”’(World Bank 2005:xiii).
Macroeconomic performance: 
confluence of supply shocks and 
constrained demand
Growth rates in selected Pacific island 
countries are highly volatile. According to 
World Bank estimates, in the 1990s alone 
natural disasters cost the Pacific region 
US$2.8 billion (in real 2004 values).2 The latest 
major natural disasters include the 1997–98 
drought in Papua New Guinea, Cyclone Heta 
in January 2004 and the subsequent drought 
that devastated Samoa’s agriculture, and 
Cyclone Ivy in Vanuatu. In addition, Pacific 
island countries have had to cope with sharp 
increases in crude-oil prices and major 
fluctuations in other commodity prices. 
The economic vulnerability of some Pacific 
island countries has been compounded by 
political instability. For example, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB 2000) estimated 
that political instability contributed to the 
decline in the GDP of Fiji and Solomon 
Islands by 15–20 per cent in 2000.3
Volatility in GDP has, however, declined 
since 2002 and most economies have grown 
between 2 and 5 per cent per annum since 
then. Although modest, this is a significant 
improvement compared with the 1980s, 
when their average annual growth rate 
was about 0.6 per cent. As opposed to the 
dismal performance of the Pacific island 
countries, the small island economies in the 
Caribbean grew at an average annual rate 
of more than 5 per cent in a similar global 
economic environment in the 1980s (World 
Bank 1991).
The World Bank (1991:25) attributed 
the dismal performance of the Pacific 
island countries in the 1980s to ‘an inability 
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to adopt needed structural reforms’. It 
identified (1991:34) ‘a need to reduce the 
public sector’s relative command over the 
economy’s resources’ and recommended 
standard reforms in the areas of trade, 
finance and other economic activities. 
Critics, such as Lodewijks (1994), pointed 
out that most Pacific island countries 
followed the World Bank’s advice and some 
(for example, Kiribati and Samoa) became 
models of orthodox economic policies. These 
model island economies failed, however, to 
register rapid economic growth. Lodewijks 
(1994) offered the hypothesis of ‘structure-
constrained’ growth to explain the poor 
growth performance of the Pacific island 
economies. According to him, structural 
impediments to growth arise from poor 
management of natural resources, low levels 
of human resources, inadequate savings, 
high labour out-migration, vulnerability to 
trade and aid volatility and non-conducive 
cultural factors. 
The Pacific island economies have 
generally maintained macroeconomic 
stability. Inflation rates have been low (less 
than 5 per cent), except in Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tonga. Budget 
deficits in recent times have been below 2 
per cent of GDP, except in Fiji and Tonga. 
The inflation rate in Papua New Guinea 
has decelerated sharply since 2003, and in 
Solomon Islands and Tonga it has dropped 
below 10 per cent. The occasional spikes in 
the inflation rate have been due mainly to 
supply shocks such as natural disasters. For 
example, Cyclone Heta in 2004 contributed 
substantially to the sharp rise in the inflation 
rate in Samoa. The rise in world oil prices 
has been responsible for recent increases in 
inflation rates. The predominantly supply 
shock inflation in the Pacific island countries 
is evident from the weak correlation of 
inflation with the developments in budget 
balances and money supply (Table 2). 
Rigorous econometric studies confirm the 
importance of supply factors and import 
prices for inflation in the Pacific island 
countries (Dewan et al. 1999).
Despite higher world commodity 
prices, especially of oil and gold, Papua 
New Guinea’s current account surplus has 
declined. Declines in the prices of palm 
oil, cocoa and copra since 2004 could have 
contributed to the large current account 
deficit in the Solomon Islands. It seems, 
however, that Vanuatu might have avoided 
the same consequences from declining 
prices for palm oil, cocoa and copra by 
allowing its real exchange rate to depreciate. 
While Solomon Islands’ exchange rate has 
remained stable, its higher inflation rate 
could have contributed to this outcome.
In sum, while the Pacific island countries 
are vulnerable to various supply shocks, their 
growth appears to be demand constrained. 
This is evident from weak correlations 
between inflation and indicators of demand 
shocks such as money supply growth and 
budget deficits. The lack of correlation 
between budget deficits and the current 
account position provides further evidence 
of the demand-constrained nature of these 
economies (Table 3). It seems therefore that 
despite various obstacles to supply (as 
Lodewijks 1994 points out), most Pacific 
island countries have excess capacity. The 
limited domestic market, not compensated 
for by export markets, can explain part 
of this. As the next section demonstrates, 
however, the inadequate effective demand 
has been largely policy induced.
Constraining macroeconomic 
policies
Some of  the  larger  Paci f ic  i s land 
economies, such as Papua New Guinea, 
Fiji, Solomon Islands and Samoa, suffered 
serious economic shocks in the 1980s and 
1990s and had to seek adjustment and 
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stabilisation support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF-supported 
stabilisation measures included the 
usual mix of reducing expenditure and 
switching policies (Siwatibau 1993). The 
Pacific island economies have, therefore, 
generally had conservative fiscal and 
monetary policies since the late 1980s or 
early 1990s.4 Improvement in the fiscal 
situation, however, was not achieved on 
the revenue side. The revenue-raising 
efforts did not yield much despite tax 
reforms, including the introduction of 
the value-added tax, since government 
revenue was heavily dependent on exports 
of commodities.5 Fiscal improvement was 
achieved mostly by cutting development 
and public investment expenditure, since 
the governments could do very little with 
the public sector wage bill.6 Even the World 
Bank, which supported the conservative 
macroeconomic agenda, admitted that 
‘[t]he effect of budget tightening on 
government investment is most pronounced 
in Fiji’ (World Bank 1998:25). The Fijian 
government’s development expenditure 
declined from 9 per cent of GDP in the early 
1980s to 3 per cent by 1995—‘a level which is 
Table 2  Correlation between inflation, budget deficits and monetary supply growth in 
selected Pacific island countries, 1995–2005
 Inflation  and  Inflation and  Monetary supply growth 
 monetary supply growth  budget deficits  and budget deficits
Fiji –0.104 0.503 –0.059 
Papua New Guinea –0.413 –0.434 0.508 
Samoa –0.520 0.345 –0.574 
Solomon Islands 0.041 0.193 0.084 
Tonga 0.535 –0.258 –0.439 
Vanuatu –0.048 –0.476 –0.250
Note: Monetary supply refers to M2 and budget balance includes grants. 
Source: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2006. Economic and Social Survey of 
Asia and the Pacific 2006, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, New York 
and Bangkok:66–7.
Table 3  Correlation between current account balances and budget balances, 1995–2005
  Correlation coefficient
Fiji 0.152 
Papua New Guinea 0.051 
Samoa 0.746 
Solomon Islands 0.038 
Tonga 0.013 
Vanuatu –0.756
Source: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2006. Economic and Social Survey of 
Asia and the Pacific 2006, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, New York 
and Bangkok:66–7.
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generally considered too low to sustain [the] 
government’s strategy of private sector-led 
growth’ (World Bank 1998:25).
Public investment has historically been 
the dominant component of total investment 
in the Pacific island economies, due to their 
underdeveloped private sectors. The decline 
in public investment has therefore meant a 
sharp drop in capital accumulation. Research 
done in the Department of Economics of the 
University of the South Pacific reveals that 
the contribution of total factor productivity 
in Pacific island economies is very small, 
implying mainly factor accumulation-
driven growth (Rao et al. 2006). The declines 
in public investment must therefore have 
constrained economic growth in the Pacific 
island countries. 
Due to the absence of a well-developed 
domestic capital market in developing 
countries, their fiscal deficits are financed 
mainly by borrowing from central banks. In 
the case of Pacific island economies, however, 
donor funds provide an important avenue 
for non-inflationary financing of deficits. 
Perhaps this explains the lack of association 
of inflation with budget deficits and money 
supply growth. More importantly, in the 
Pacific island economies that have central 
banks, there is a legislative limit on the 
government’s ability to borrow from the 
central banks. Such limits are generally set 
at a fixed percentage of average annual 
revenue over a number of years immediately 
preceding the budget year (Siwatibau 1993). 
This restraint on government borrowing 
from the central banks has been put in place 
because of the fear of inflation. Although 
this limit has been broken at times, monetary 
authorities have generally prevailed over 
fiscal authorities (Ali and Jayaraman 2001). 
As a result, the macroeconomic policy mix 
remains by and large conservative.
While the conservative fiscal and 
monetary policies have been successful in 
restraining demand, the switching policy 
of devaluation or large depreciations in 
countries with their own currencies does 
not seem to have produced the expected 
results. In highly import-dependent 
economies, devaluation immediately 
translates into higher domestic prices, 
leading to upward adjustments of nominal 
wages. Such developments neutralise the 
effects of devaluation on relative prices 
between tradables and non-tradables. 
This phenomenon occurred in Pacific 
island economies that imitated Australia’s 
centralised wage-fixation system or indexed 
wages to inflation (Treadgold 1992; Smith 
1987).7 In such situations, devaluation, 
instead of improving international 
competitiveness, basically reduces demand 
by cutting real income. As a result, there is a 
net decline in aggregate demand.8
In sum, for the past two decades, 
the Pacific island economies have been 
pursuing orthodox macroeconomic policies 
aimed at stabilising nominal variables (for 
example, very low inflation rates, low 
budget deficits or balanced or surplus 
budgets). This policy stance is based on the 
assumption that nominal stabilisation will 
lead to a brighter investment climate and 
enhanced international competitiveness, 
and hence, higher economic growth. The 
stabilisation of nominal variables, however, 
failed to generate supply-side responses. 
This was due to reductions in development 
and public investment expenditure and 
the failure of devaluation to alter relative 
prices. What we observe in the Pacific 
island countries is therefore a combination 
of low inflation and subdued economic 
growth—a situation that can be described 
as a ‘stabilisation trap’ (Chowdhury 2005a). 
It is unlikely that the Pacific island countries 
can generate the high growth needed for 
improvements in per capita real income in 
the face of rapid population growth when 
they are focused on keeping the inflation 
rate at a very low level and are unable to 
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restructure their government expenditure 
towards public investment in infrastructure 
and human resource development. 
Focus on very low inflation rates 
when inflation is due predominantly to 
supply shocks has also contributed to 
excessive output volatility. Beddies (1999) 
demonstrated that inflation-targeting 
monetary policy does not lead to optimal 
output stabilisation of aggregate supply 
shocks; in fact, a price-stabilisation target 
leads to greater output variability. This can 
be explained using Figure 1.
In Panel A, the response to an adverse 
supply shock is an expansionary monetary 
policy to stabilise output at Q0, whereas in 
Panel B, the response is a contractionary 
monetary policy to stabilise the price level 
at P0. When the response is an expansionary 
policy, the price level rises further to P2—that 
is, higher inflation. On the other hand, when 
the objective is price stabilisation through 
a contractionary monetary policy, output 
declines further to Q2.
The legacy of the stabilisation programs 
of the 1990s remains. Fiscal and monetary 
policies in the Pacific island countries by and 
large continue to be conservative. This is 
evident from the relatively high real lending 
interest rates (Figure 2a) and near-balanced 
budgets.9
Assessing the impact of high real interest 
rates in the Caribbean island economies, 
Worrell observes that 
…the increased costs of finance appear 
to have made firms that depend on 
bank credit less competitive in the 
production of tradables and more 
expensive in the production of non-
tradables (1987:213). 
One can expect very similar consequences 
of high real interest rates in Pacific island 
countries, since bank credit is the dominant 
form of external financing for most firms. 
On the other hand, high real interest rates 
did not attract significant capital inflows, as 
other confounding factors, such as extreme 
vulnerability, outweighed expected gains 
Figure 1 Adjustment to supply shocks
  P      P 
  AD1  AS1
 AD0    AS0  AD0       AS1    AS0
    P2             AD1    
    P1      P1   
   P0      P0
                      Q1   Q0      Q2     Q1   Q0
Panel A     Panel B 
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from higher interest rates. Their major 
sources of capital inflows—foreign aid and 
workers’ remittances—are not sensitive to 
interest rate differentials.
While the real lending rates are high, 
the real deposit rates have been negative in 
a number of countries (Figure 2b). One can 
expect this to have disincentive effects on 
household savings decisions. The monetary 
and interest rate policies have not therefore 
been conducive to savings and capital 
formation. 
Macroeconomic policy options
What role can macroeconomic policies 
play in very open small island economies? 
Khatkhate and Short (1980) believe very 
little. According to them, the degree of 
policymakers’ control over macroeconomic 
target variables (for example, output, 
inflation and external balance) is inversely 
proportional to the degree of openness 
of product markets.10 Because mini-states 
are price takers in international markets, 
the volume of exports, and therefore 
output, is determined by the mini-state’s 
productive capacity, which is influenced 
more by factors such as weather than by 
macroeconomic policies. At the same time, 
because they are highly import dependent, 
their inflation is by and large determined 
by their trading partners. 
Corden (1984), using the example of 
Singapore, developed a model of a small 
open economy in which all products 
were tradable, and demonstrated that 
the exchange rate could be used to target 
inflation and wages policies to target 
competitiveness, and hence, employment. 
Since the aggregate demand for output is 
perfectly price elastic, domestic demand 
and hence monetary and fiscal policy do 
not have any direct effects on the price 
level or employment.11 To the extent that 
the monetary authority pegs the exchange 
rate to a predetermined level, money supply 
becomes endogenous. Monetary policy 
works therefore only through its effects on 
the exchange rate. When the exchange rate 
is allowed to float, perfect capital mobility 
renders fiscal policy ineffective due to 
induced exchange rate effects.12
Treadgold (1992) provided a critique 
of Khatkhate and Short, and extended 
Corden’s model to suit the conditions of 
small Pacific island economies. To begin 
with, most Pacific island economies do 
not have separate currencies; they use 
Australian, New Zealand or US dollars. 
They therefore cannot have the exchange 
rate instrument as the Corden model 
suggests, but they can still use wages policy 
to target employment. Second, even for those 
economies that have their own currencies, 
the assumption of perfect capital mobility is 
not relevant, as this would require perfect 
substitutability between domestic and 
foreign bonds. Even when the assumption 
of perfect capital mobility is replaced with 
incomplete capital mobility, Treadgold 
shows that under different labour-market 
conditions the policy implications of the 
basic Corden model remain relevant. When 
money wages are inflexible downward, 
the achievement of the employment target 
would require abandoning an independent 
inflation target. That is, the exchange rate 
should be varied to achieve the domestic 
inflation needed to reduce real wages for the 
employment target. On the other hand, the 
downward real-wage inflexibility excludes 
the possibility of achieving any independent 
employment target, and macro policy (that 
is, exchange rate policy) should be directed 
to controlling the price level only. Finally, 
the micro-states that have a high degree of 
labour mobility with larger economies face 
essentially a given real wage determined in 
the larger economies. Their labour market 
mimics a competitive labour market, 
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Note: Real interest rate = nominal rate – inflation. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), various years. International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Figure 2a  Real lending rates, 1995–2005 (per cent)
Figure 2b  Real deposit rates
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and hence employment is determined 
endogenously. As in the case of downward 
real-wage inflexibility, these micro-states 
should use the exchange rate to achieve the 
inflation target.
In sum, fiscal and monetary policies 
cannot play a stabilising role in any of the 
three theoretical models reviewed above. 
In the Corden model and its modified 
version, the stabilisation (price level 
and employment) role is assigned to the 
exchange rate and wages policies. The 
fact that the Pacific island economies can 
maintain very low inflation rates using 
conventional demand-management policies 
proves Khatkhate and Short’s conclusion 
wrong. To the extent that the effectiveness 
of policy instruments (exchange rates) in the 
Corden–Treadgold framework depends on 
falling real wages, it does not offer much 
hope in economies in which poverty is high 
and the real wage is at the subsistence level. 
In these countries, real-wage resistance does 
not have to be an outcome of a centralised 
wage-setting mechanism and/or the nature 
of labour market institutions. The real wage 
is already so low that it cannot be reduced 
any further.13
All three models focus on the demand-
side role of fiscal and monetary policies and 
ignore the fact that in developing countries 
these policies are used predominantly for 
economic growth and hence enhancing 
aggregate supply. Thus, employment 
creation in these models implies movement 
along the labour-demand curve (that 
is, a reduction in real wages). They also 
assume symmetry in capital inflows 
and outflows, and consider only short-
term portfolio investment, not long-term 
foreign direct investment. Most developing 
countries, especially the small Pacific 
island economies, do not attract much 
capital flow. As noted earlier, vulnerability 
risks outweigh the expected gains from 
interest rate differentials, and Pacific island 
countries are more prone to capital flight 
than to capital inflow. For their long-term 
economic growth, they need foreign direct 
investment and foreign aid, which are 
not sensitive to interest rate differentials. 
Once these considerations are taken into 
account, fiscal and monetary policies 
assume radically different roles from those 
derived from the Mundell–Fleming model 
and its variants.
In particular, when the direct long-term 
(growth) and short-term (demand) aspects 
of macroeconomic policies are juxtaposed 
or treated simultaneously, employment 
creation does not depend on lower real 
wages (movement along the demand curve); 
instead, employment is created by shifting 
the labour-demand curve—that is, what is 
needed in fragile economies such as Pacific 
island countries are state-led development 
strategies. 
A state-led development strategy
Fiscal policy
Given the poor state of infrastructure and 
human resources and other critical factors 
influencing economic growth, and the lack 
of private investment in these areas (due 
to market failure or inadequate markets), 
the government has to play a leading role. 
This means a predominant role for fiscal 
policy and the acceptance of larger budget 
deficits than currently aimed for. Obviously, 
the question arises as to the financing of 
deficits and its implications for inflation and 
external balance, as well as the sustainability 
of government debt. First, we should note the 
‘golden rule’: borrow to finance investment 
and balance recurrent/routine expenditure. 
If borrowing is done to invest productively, 
then debt will remain sustainable—economic 
growth will generate revenues to repair the 
budget deficit.
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Due to poor credit ratings in the 
international capital markets and the lack 
of well-developed domestic capital markets, 
Pacific island country governments have 
two options for borrowing: central banks 
and foreign aid. Foreign aid has indeed been 
a significant source of government financing 
in Pacific island countries. Borrowing from 
central banks will increase money supply. 
The endogeneity of money supply will 
prevent interest rates from rising, and hence, 
there will be no possibility of a crowding-
out effect. On the contrary, government 
investment in infrastructure and human 
resource development is likely to crowd-
in private investment.14 While improved 
infrastructure reduces business costs, 
subsidised provision of public health and 
education can be regarded as social wages, 
which dampen wage demand; both factors 
enhance the investment climate.15 
As noted earlier, the Pacific island 
economies are demand constrained, and 
expansionary policies are therefore unlikely 
to cause inflationary pressure or balance of 
payments problems.16 Additionally, since 
the productive capacity of the economy is 
likely to expand with public investment, 
the increase in money supply will not be 
as inflationary. In any case, a moderate 
level of inflation is found not to be harmful 
for economic growth (Chowdhury 2005a). 
Figures 3a and 3b show that the experience of 
Pacific island economies with regard to fiscal 
balance, inflation and growth is consistent 
with evidence in other developing countries. 
In the absence of a well-developed taxation 
system, inflationary tax (or seigniorage) 
becomes an important source of government 
revenue for financing development (Kalecki 
1976).
Foreign aid
Foreign aid is a non-inflationary source of 
finance for the government. Pacific island 
economies are among the highest aid 
recipients in the developing world. There 
is a general perception, however, that the 
large aid flows have failed to spur rapid 
economic growth.17 Significant amounts of 
aid go to support civil servant salaries and 
the government’s recurrent expenditure, 
which are drags on development (World 
Bank 1998). A recent comprehensive study of 
seven Pacific island countries has, however, 
found a statistically significant positive 
relationship between aid and growth but 
with diminishing returns (Pavlov and 
Sugden 2006).18 This finding is consistent 
with findings elsewhere and is not sensitive to 
either the policy environment or institutions. 
The findings imply therefore that many of the 
lessons learnt in other countries are largely 
applicable to the Pacific island countries.
The apparent lack of aid effectiveness 
or diminishing returns to aid can be traced 
to a number of confounding factors: the 
first is the uncertainty of disbursements 
and the divergence between commitments 
and disbursements. Aid volatility can 
cause significant problems for project 
implementation and the government budget. 
Second, aid is fraught with principal-agent 
problems. The recipient countries not 
only renege on commitment to reforms, 
they divert aid funds to undesirable uses, 
such as government consumption or 
development projects chosen purely on 
political grounds.
Third, diminishing returns to aid could 
result from the lack of absorptive capacity. 
This could arise for a number of reasons, such 
as an inability to provide counterpart funds, 
deficiencies in planning and sequencing or 
lack of administrative capacity. Finally, large 
aid flows can cause real appreciation of local 
currencies to the detriment of the tradable 
sector; this is known as the ‘Dutch disease 
syndrome’.19
The key element for addressing the 
above issues is the predictability of aid 
flows and confidence in donor–recipient 
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Figure 3a  Fiscal balance, inflation and growth, 1990–97
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Note: Countries: (1) Cook Islands; (2) Fiji; (3) Federated States of Micronesia; (4) Kiribati; (5) Papua New Guinea; 
(6) Marshall Islands; (7) Samoa; (8) Solomon Islands; (9) Tonga; (10) Tuvalu; (11) Vanuatu. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), various years. International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Figure 3b  Fiscal balance, inflation and growth, 1998–2003
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Note: Countries: (1) Cook Islands; (2) Fiji; (3) Federated States of Micronesia; (4) Kiribati; (5) Papua New Guinea; 
(6) Marshall Islands; (7) Samoa; (8) Solomon Islands; (9) Tonga; (10) Tuvalu; (11) Vanuatu. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), various years. International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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relationships. The Pacific island economies 
experience high volatility of fiscal revenues 
due to their heavy reliance on trade. Aid 
is needed to smooth out fluctuations in 
revenues and should not be another source 
of shocks to the budget. Perhaps a ‘fiscal 
insurance scheme’ could be developed with 
donor funds for the entire region to address 
volatility in fiscal revenues.20 That is, 
donors could contribute a portion of aid to 
a regional common pool to be drawn on by 
countries facing unforeseen declines in fiscal 
revenues. The recipient countries should 
also contribute a portion of their revenue 
windfalls to this regional common pool.21 A 
jointly managed regional common pool or 
the fiscal insurance scheme suggested above 
could play a positive role in improving 
donor–recipient relations. 
Donors can help overcome some of 
the absorptive-capacity problems by not 
requiring counterpart funds and by providing 
technical assistance in aid management 
and administration. Other measures to 
monitor aid administration could also be 
considered. For example, aid could be used 
to help national governments to strengthen 
democratic institutions designed as checks 
and balances on government expenditure. 
Finally, the possibility of Dutch disease 
from aid is remote, as these countries do 
not operate at full employment—a vital 
assumption of the Dutch disease hypothesis. 
Moreover, the Dutch disease syndrome can be 
avoided. First, if aid is used for direct imports 
and/or technical assistance, there is no need 
for real appreciation for resource transfer to 
occur. Second, if aid is used for productivity 
enhancing investment, it offsets the impact 
of the real exchange rate on competitiveness 
(Chowdhury and McKinley 2006).
Monetary policy
Growth-oriented monetary policy has 
two features. First, monetary policy has to 
accommodate the government’s investment 
needs. This is premised on the large body of 
empirical evidence showing that moderate 
inflation does not harm economic growth, 
and could even be necessary. There is no 
evidence of a negative relationship between 
inflation and growth in Pacific island 
economies when inflation rates are within 
the moderate range of 10–12 per cent (Figure 
4). The East Asian experience also confirms 
this. Furthermore, an accommodative 
monetary policy is needed to ease the 
counterpart funding problem for the 
utilisation of aid and hence to enhance the 
absorption of aid.22
Second, the monetary authorities 
should use low-cost, directed credits to 
support labour-intensive small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Of course, subsidised 
special credit programs distort the credit 
market as well as running the risk of being 
infected with rent-seeking behaviour. The 
costs of distortions and rent seeking have, 
however, to be weighed against the costs of 
market failure in the credit market, which 
results in discrimination against SMEs and 
the agricultural sector.23
One might have concerns about the 
impact of low-interest policies on savings 
and financial sector development. To begin 
with, low real interest rates must not mean 
negative real deposit interest rates, which 
is the case in a number of Pacific island 
countries. Second, empirical evidence shows 
that in low-income countries, financial 
development is mainly demand led—that 
is, it follows growth. This is consistent with 
the observation that current income plays a 
more dominant role in household savings 
decisions than the interest rate.
Exchange rate and capital account 
policies
The Pacific island economies have exchange 
rate systems ranging from dollarised to 
floating, and hence, offer excellent scope for 
evaluating different exchange rate regimes. 
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There is no clear evidence of superiority of 
any one regime (Table 4). As expected, the 
dollarised economies have inflation rates 
close to the rates in the country whose 
currency they use, and the only country with 
an independently floating system (Papua 
New Guinea) has higher inflation rates. 
The economies with a pegged exchange 
rate system have mixed experiences with 
inflation—among the countries and between 
the two periods. There is, however, no 
significant difference in the growth and 
budget balance experiences across different 
exchange rate regimes, except for those 
using the US dollar. This is perhaps due 
to the high volatility of US grants to these 
economies. 
As opposed to the IMF’s suggestion of 
freer and more flexible currency regimes, 
some observers have recently argued for 
a dollarised regime, and the use of the 
Australian dollar in the Pacific economies 
(de Brouwer 2002; Duncan 2002).24 The 
argument is based on the insufficient depth 
of domestic financial and foreign exchange 
markets to support the liquidity necessary 
to maintain a freely floating exchange rate, 
and the lack of skilled personnel to run 
a central bank. The adoption of a strong 
foreign currency is also likely to impose 
fiscal discipline in economies in which 
maintaining central bank independence 
is difficult. Some commentators have 
also examined the possibility of forming 
a currency union like the East Caribbean 
Monetary Union (Jayaraman et al. 2005).
W h i l e  d o l l a r i s a t i o n  i m p ro v e s 
macroeconomic stability, the main objection 
to it could arise from the vastly different 
types of shocks between the Pacific island 
economies and the country of the strong 
currency (Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States). Responses to these shocks 
therefore require some macroeconomic 
Figure 4  The inflation–growth relationship, 1970–2005
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policy independence, which will be lost if 
the currency is dollarised. As highlighted 
earlier, the low inflation rates of the strong-
currency country might be too constraining 
for the Pacific island economies, which are 
prone to supply shocks and need to undergo 
structural change. Furthermore, dollarisation 
will deprive them of seigniorage—an 
important source of revenue for countries 
with a poor domestic revenue base.25 
A case can be made, however, in favour 
of a currency or monetary union, despite 
the fact that there is a lack of significant 
convergence of macroeconomic indicators. 
The Pacific island economies have already 
taken major steps towards regional 
cooperation by signing two agreements 
in 2001. One, signed by all 14 independent 
island countries, known as the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), aims to 
usher in free trade among them by 2012. The 
second agreement, the Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER), covers 
all 14 Pacific island countries and Australia 
and New Zealand.26
The question is whether they should 
adopt a common currency before economic 
convergence, as in the case of the European 
Union. Convergence is not, however, a 
necessary condition. As Scitovsky observes 
Table 4  Exchange rate regimes and economic performance
 
Pacific island 
economies
 
Exchange 
rate regime
Overall fiscal balance 
(% of GDP)
 
Inflation (%)
 
Growth (%)
1990–97 1998–2005 1990–97 1998–2005 1990–97 1998–2005
Cook Islands
Fiji
Federated States 
of Micronesia
Kiribati
Papua New 
Guinea
Marshall Islands
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
NZ$
Peg*
US$ 
A$
Float 
US$
Peg*
Peg*
Peg*
A$
Peg*
–4.0
–3.2
–15.9 
6.8
–2.7 
–20.3
–2.8
–5.1
0.1
–6.1
–4.0
–1.0
–3.0
–7.8 
4.2
–1.7 
11.1
–0.7
–3.7
–0.8
18.0
–3.1
2.7
2.6
2.3 
3.0
5.6 
–0.9
–3.1
2.9
3.3
5.6
4.4
2.9
3.2
0.2 
2.2
10.4 
0.3
4.4
8.5
8.1
3.0
2.6
3.0
4.3
3.3 
4.2
7.4 
6.0
5.7
10.8
4.6
2.9
3.4
4.3
2.9
0.2 
4.6
2.6 
0.3
3.9
–1.4
3.0
6.4
0.9
* pegged to a basket of currencies whose composition and weights are generally kept confidential 
Note: Percentage inflation rates (1995–2005): US = 2.5; A = 2.7; NZ = 2.4  
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), various years. International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2006. 
Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2006, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, New York and Bangkok:66–7.
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(1958), the formation of a currency union 
itself could lead to convergence.
In addition, there are other advantages. 
First, the currency union will expand the 
regional market and can offer a buffer 
against terms-of-trade shocks, which 
might differ for member countries. Second, 
individual member countries do not have 
to keep large foreign exchange reserves, 
which have high opportunity costs when 
they need large investment in infrastructure 
and human resource development.27 Third, 
it allows them as a group to follow a pegged 
system with the outside world without 
having to expose themselves excessively to 
speculative attacks. An adjustable pegged 
system is essentially a real-target approach 
(targeting export competitiveness) instead 
of a nominal-target approach (targeting 
inflation). 
An economy (or economic union) 
cannot, however, have macroeconomic 
policy independence and an open capital 
account under a pegged exchange rate 
system. This means there should be some 
restrictions on capital mobility. As pointed 
out earlier, the Pacific island countries do 
not receive much short-term private capital. 
Their main sources of outside capital are 
foreign aid and worker remittances, which 
are not sensitive to interest rates. Their main 
problem is capital outflow, and it makes 
sense to have some controls on capital flight 
(Chowdhury 2005b). Restrictions on short-
term capital outflows do not necessarily 
create any disincentives for long-term 
foreign direct investment. 
Concluding remarks
This paper reviews the macroeconomic 
performance of, and policies in, small Pacific 
island economies. These are among the most 
vulnerable economies situated in a fragile 
environmental zone. Their geography 
and demography pose serious obstacles 
to development. This paper argues for a 
more activist government in the Keynesian 
mode in such economies. Given their 
poor revenue base and meagre domestic 
savings, this means accepting higher budget 
deficits and inflation rates than what they 
have targeted during the past two decades 
under the conditionality of the IMF and 
the World Bank’s structural-adjustment 
programs. Government expenditure needs 
to be restructured away from recurrent 
expenditure to development projects and 
human resource development. Monetary 
policy, too, needs to be accommodative 
and geared to support small enterprises 
rather than property or consumption 
booms. Donors need to support well-
designed development projects in a more 
predictable manner. The paper also argues 
for a monetary union with an adjustable 
peg common currency with the rest of the 
world. 
Finally, it must be noted that the success 
of the state-led development strategy 
depends on the quality of governance 
and the administrative capacity of the 
government; both are scarce in Pacific 
island countries. Although there are 
doubts about the effectiveness of aid 
conditionality, donors can play an important 
role in improving governance by supporting 
democratic institution building through 
technical assistance. Donor-funded civil 
service training programs can go a long 
way in building administrative capacity. 
In other words, aid strategy must strike a 
balance between hard-core development 
projects (for example, infrastructure) and 
soft-core projects (for example, institution 
building, technical assistance and civil 
service training). 
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Notes
1 See Armstrong et al. (1998). They find that 
size is not a barrier to micro-states’ growth; 
instead, their fortune is tied to the region in 
which they are situated and to their larger 
neighbours.
2 Between 1950 and 2004, extreme natural 
disasters such as cyclones, droughts and 
tsunamis accounted for 65 per cent of the total 
economic impact of disasters on the region’s 
economies. Ten of the 15 most extreme events 
reported in the past half-century occurred 
in the past 15 years (World Bank 2006:viii; 
AusAID 2005).
3 In assessing the economic impact of political 
instability, Chand (2003:6) concludes: ‘Nature 
has also contributed to the [Pacific island 
countries’] troubles in the form of cyclones, 
earthquakes, floods and drought. Man-made 
disasters such as coups, violent conflicts, 
corruption, and crime have acted as major 
distractions from productive activity.’ In an 
earlier study, the same author found that in 
Fiji the growth effects of coups were much 
more debilitating than cyclones.
4 Countries that do not have their own currency 
(such as Cook Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands 
and Tuvalu) cannot have an independent 
monetary policy; but since they are tied 
to low-inflation countries (Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States), their 
monetary framework can be characterised 
as conservative.
5 Vanuatu has no income tax and this seriously 
limits its domestic revenue-raising capacity.
6 The World Bank (1998:23) summarises the 
situation as follows: ‘[i]n all of the PMCs 
[Pacific island member countries] there are 
two imbalances in the economic composition 
of expenditure: the first is between recurrent 
expenditure and investment and the 
second is between the wage and non-wage 
components of recurrent expenditure. Both 
of these imbalances impede growth and 
development. For example, when there is a 
shortfall in the government’s resources for 
current expenditure, fiscal adjustment often 
cuts development expenditure creating an 
imbalance between them.’
7 For similar experiences in the Caribbean 
small island economies, see Worrell (1987).
8 Drake (1983) notes that output in micro-states 
is inelastic to relative price changes due to 
structural rigidities, such as difficulties in 
retraining the labour force for redeployment. 
This inhibits the resource-switching remedy 
of devaluation. Even when the economy is 
flexible, the impact of devaluation on the 
traded sector is limited. Since the market for 
non-traded goods and services is very small, 
the relative price effect will be negligible.
9 Sharp declines in real rates were caused by 
sudden increases in inflation due to supply 
shocks such as cyclones.
10 By the mini-state’s ‘exposure to foreign 
trade such that the economic targets of its 
economy are largely beyond its control’ 
(Khatkahate and Short 1980:1018). Caram 
(1989:39–56) holds a similar view: ‘Under 
the conditions now prevalent in small 
developing countries, it is not to be expected 
that monetary financing and the ensuing 
increase in effective demand will result in an 
appreciable increase in domestic production. 
The domestically generated supply of goods 
is insufficiently diversified and, as a result of 
physical and organisational bottlenecks, has 
barely any short-term elasticity. Owing to this 
and to the ample opportunities for imports, 
despite the exchange controls in force, the 
additional demand will focus largely on the 
supply from abroad. The so-called monetary 
approach to the balance of payments…proves 
to be highly topical for these countries.’
11 In an economy (closed or open) with a 
downward aggregate demand (Figure 1), 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies 
raise the price level. The increased price 
level reduces real wages and hence increases 
employment and output. When an economy 
faces a perfectly price elastic aggregate 
demand, however, the domestic price level 
cannot differ from the world price. 
12 This follows from the standard Mundell-
Fleming IS-LM-BP model with flexible 
exchange rates and perfect capital mobility. 
13 Lodewijks (1988) deals exhaustively with the 
limitations of real-wage cuts in the context of 
Papua New Guinea. 
14 The World Bank (1998:xii) notes that in Pacific 
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island economies, ‘[b]asic education, health 
care, and physical infrastructure are the 
highest priorities to improve living standards 
for the widest group of poor people, and to 
lay the foundations for sustained, broad-
based income growth’.
15 This is the experience of the successful East 
and Southeast Asian economies. 
16 Extreme openness of island economies 
reduces the size of the expenditure multiplier 
as demand spills over to imports. This 
means the balance of payments could be an 
effective constraint to growth. Here lies the 
importance of foreign aid—a point discussed 
later. Helleiner (1982) also highlights the 
importance of foreign aid in addressing 
balance of payments shocks.
17 See, for example, Feeny (2007). A negative 
correlation between aid flows and economic 
growth could, however, be just a statistical 
artefact. It could be due to the fact that in most 
cases, aid flows respond to natural disasters 
and other negative supply shocks, which 
retard growth. None of the studies that report 
a negative aid growth relationship conducted 
any counter-factual analysis. That is, what 
would have happened in the absence of aid? 
If aid responds to negative supply shocks 
then the non-availability of aid is likely to 
exacerbate the impact of negative supply 
shocks and there will be a deeper drop in 
income. 
18 The seven Pacific island countries studied are 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.
19 For evidence of ‘Dutch disease syndrome’ 
in Pacific micro-states, see Laplange et al. 
(2001).
20 dos Reis (2004) highlights the usefulness of 
a fiscal insurance scheme for the countries 
of the Caribbean Currency Union. Such a 
scheme can alleviate problems of policy 
coordination within a currency union. We 
suggest a currency union for the Pacific island 
economies later in the paper. 
21 Some Pacific countries already have a fiscal 
stabilisation fund. The regional stabilisation 
fund can supplement the national fund.
22 The traditional rationale for aid is to fill the 
savings–investment gap and the current 
account gap. The savings–investment gap 
is generally related to government budget 
deficits. Aid funds are converted into domestic 
currency to be spent by the government and 
this causes inflationary pressure leading to 
real appreciation. The real appreciation, in 
turn, causes higher imports to be financed 
by foreign currencies made available through 
aid in the first place. This is the normal 
channel through which aid is ‘spent’ and 
‘absorbed’. Conservative fiscal and monetary 
policies therefore lead only to accumulation 
of foreign reserves and defeat the purpose of 
aid (Chowdhury and McKinley 2006).
23 See Chowdhury (2005) for an illustration 
of various monetary policy instruments 
for achieving employment and moderate 
inflation targets.
24 Jayaraman (2005) does not find much support 
for using the Australian dollar. Based on 
trade-flow statistics, he argues that there is a 
stronger case for adopting an Asian currency. 
Bowman (2005) concludes, ‘[d]ollarisation to 
the US dollar, the de-facto standard in Asia, 
or a move to a common currency may be 
preferable alternatives to dollarising to the 
Australian dollar.’
25 See Drake (1983) for a comprehensive 
discussion of exchange rate choices for 
small open economies. Drake suggests an 
intermediate regime between an absolutely 
fixed exchange rate regime with no monetary 
discretion and a fully flexible exchange rate 
regime with monetary discretion.
26 The PACER became effective on 3 October 
2002, as it required only six ratifications. 
Australia and New Zealand and four other 
Pacific island countries ratified to make 
it effective earlier than PICTA. Two other 
Pacific island countries followed them. The 
PICTA became effective on 13 April 2003, 
immediately after the minimum seven 
ratifications were obtained. Subsequently, 
two more Pacific island countries ratified. As 
of May 2004, five Pacific island countries had 
not ratified either PICTA or PACER: Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Palau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
27 On average, the Pacific island country central 
banks hold foreign reserves equivalent to 
four to five months of imports of goods.
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